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1
Beyond Open Hostilities 
and Collective Bargaining
Prologue
The experience reported in this book reflects favorably on 
the creativity, versatility, and flexibility of American in 
dustrial relations. The deep differences that underlie the 
traditional adversarial postures of labor and management 
have not precluded search for, and invention of, oppor 
tunities for cooperation to mutual advantage. The interest of 
both sides in accommodation has intensified in recent years 
of unrelenting national economic stress, and it promises to 
persist in a world setting of continuing ferment.
Preoccupation in this book with collaborative schemes 
should not be misconstrued, of course, as disparagement of 
other plausible avenues toward needed improvement in our 
nation's productivity and in the quality and salability of its 
products. Effective labor-management cooperation can only 
complement, rather than substitute for, appropriate private 
decisions concerning, say, the mix and design of products, 
techniques of production and distribution, the amount and 
character of physical capital used, wages, and prices. It can 
only complement, rather than substitute for, appropriate 
policies and actions regarding, say, the money supply and in 
terest rates, the size and allocation of public expenditures,
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taxation, regulation, incentives for individual saving and 
business investment, and support for education and 
research. Government's manifold involvements, moreover, 
influence the disposition of labor and management to ex 
plore and pursue cooperative undertakings in addition to 
affecting the national economic performance in other in 
dicated ways.
Due attention must be paid to intercultural differences and 
to our own indigenous strengths when the applicability of 
foreign collaborative arrangements is appraised. At a 
distance, it is easy to overstate the successes achieved 
abroad, to misidentify the critical factors, and to misjudge 
their durability. In any case, literal transplantability is out of 
the question; and selective adaptation entails costs that have 
to seem justified by expected benefits.
To concede the obstacles to naturalization of foreign 
models is not to imply, on the other hand, that domestic im 
itation or diffusion is easy. A cooperative arrangement that 
works in one company, industry, or community is not 
routinely transferable to another. The situation is com 
parable to that experienced in the propagation of 
technology: "best practices" are identifiable more readily 
than they can be copied. Leadership, commitment at the top, 
acceptance below, good will, knowledge, skill, patience, and 
proper followup are as essential to domestic diffusion as they 
are to importation; and labor and management must expect 
benefits to exceed costs.
These remarks should be kept in mind throughout a 
reading of this book. They are offered in awareness that 
news accounts, popular literature, and even the writings of 
scholarly advocates often exaggerate prospects and mute the 
caveats. The important large truth that ought to be proclaim 
ed is less exciting: the adversary style of American industrial 
relations has permitted, rather than forestalled, ventures in 
cooperation, both home-grown and adapted, and it remains
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sufficiently plastic to adjust to new parameters. l The con 
tents of this book should provide encouragement, ideas, and 
guidance to business, labor, government, and civic leaders 
wishing to realize more fully the potential contribution of 
cooperation to the quality of the nation's output and 
worklife, its productivity, and its competitiveness in world 
trade.
Scope
As the chapter title suggests, this book is concerned with 
varieties of cooperation that complement or supplement the 
normal arrangements of labor and management for adver 
sarial interaction in pursuit of predominantly economic ob 
jectives. It features American experience, concentrating, in 
turn, on each of the principal theaters in which significant 
cooperation has occurred or is expected to occur. It pays 
special attention to, but does not focus exclusively on, the 
workplace, the most obvious site of cooperation and the one 
that is typically emphasized in the literature. Furthermore, it 
acknowledges that government has become not only a major 
employer of labor but also a major presence with which 
labor and management must, or should, reckon.
More specifically, this book examines cooperative ar 
rangements in five theaters: 2
1. The national scene, where the federal government 
usually participates as a third, but indispensable, party  
serving, for example, as a catalyst, goad, arbiter, sponsor, 
intermediary, standard-setter, monitor, guarantor, or co- 
financier (chapter 2).
2. The industry level, where the perception of a national 
interest may again accord a key third-party role to the 
federal government (chapter 3).
3. The subnational community, area, or regional level, 
where state and local governments may have explicit roles 
and the federal hand may still be visible (chapter 4).
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4. The private firm or plant, where labor and management 
have to take cognizance of parameters set by government 
policies but generally arrive at agreements without appeal to, 
or intrusion by, a third party (chapters 5-8).
5. The public agency or a component thereof, where the 
federal, state, or local government is itself the 
employer i.e., "management" (chapter 9).
In addition to looking beyond the workplace and giving 
explicit and due recognition to the pervasive government 
presence, this book has a second distinctive feature: It in 
cludes a documentary appendix. This appendix, which 
should be of practical value as well as have scholarly interest, 
presents sample agreements between labor and management 
respecting cooperation and also exhibits pertinent provisions 
of various legislative proposals, laws, avuncular guides, and 
policy statements. Two other appendices offer additional in 
formation that should appeal to practitioners and students 
of industrial relations.
Although this book ranges widely, it cannot, and does not, 
purport to cover the whole eligible domain. The relevant un 
published information is much vaster than the accessible 
portion reviewed by the authors; and, unsurprisingly, the 
published information has its gaps and its favorites. 3 No at 
tempt, furthermore, has been made to exploit the available 
literature exhaustively or to survey certain kinds of coopera 
tion that some readers or other writers might deem pertinent 
or worthy of treatment in depth.
Among the possible additional subtopics of interest, one 
does receive some attention in a later chapter and also in this 
one but is not treated in depth: cooperation at the company 
level in extremis, which involves the sharing of economic 
burdens or losses to avoid shutdowns or severe reductions of 
the workforce and which may inspire subsequent coopera 
tion of the kind that this book emphasizes. 4 No detailed con 
sideration is given to employee representation plans, com-
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pany unions, cooperative associations, or other configura 
tions established (particularly before 1930) by employers 
eager to maintain an "open shop." 5 Also omitted from this 
book is the discussion of "sweetheart" bargains between 
labor and management and other deplored or possibly illegal 
forms of "racketeering." Only passing reference is made to 
the supply of technical and related consulting services by 
union leaders and their designees to management (as 
distinguished from the active participation of the rank and 
file of workers) in the interest of reducing unit costs and in 
creasing price competitiveness. 6 Another matter left for 
other investigators is the engagement of labor and manage 
ment in joint or parallel activities to protect or advance par 
ticular firms, industries, or communities through advertis 
ing, political lobbying, possibly illegal collusion against com 
petitors, or litigation. 7 Finally, we do not treat informal, 
spontaneous collaboration that is so natural to very small 
enterprises in which workers and employers have frequent 
personal contact.
Some Definitions9
A few of the terms already used have multiple meanings or 
may, for other reasons, require commentary. Discussion of 
them extends our remarks on the scope of this book. It may 
be gratuitous to dwell on the different connotations of words 
like "labor," "management," "government," and "state," 
but it should help the reader to know that "cooperation" 
and "collaboration" are used interchangeably.
It is difficult, but also unnecessary, to draw a precise 
boundary between "normal arrangements" for adversarial 
interaction and the extra-normal modes of collaboration that 
are of primary interest to this book. In a country like ours, 
the field of industrial relations as a whole is still open, grow 
ing, and evolutionary. What may be considered extra- 
normal at one time or in one place could well appear normal 
later or elsewhere.
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"Open hostilities," a term used in the chapter title, refers 
to the most dramatic, but fortunately not the most prevalent, 
of the interactions between labor and management. It in 
cludes strikes, strikebreaking, "job actions," "sit-ins," 
"sick-outs," mass picketing, boycotts, injunctions, 
lockouts, etc. Such hostilities have sometimes involved 
serious property damage, armed confrontations, and violent 
"massacres." 9
A much more common mode of adversarial interaction is 
negotiation, best exemplified nowadays by "collective 
bargaining" to which the chapter title also refers. Such 
bargaining has been politely described as "a process of 
reasoning and persuasion," 10 and, even more loftily, as the 
foundation for a system of "industrial jurisprudence." 11 It 
does not, however, exclude threats of resort to open 
hostilities and is sometimes reinforced by demonstrations 
and token work stoppages. Yet, despite its histrionics, 
bluster, tensions, crises, and frustrations, the bargaining 
ritual eventuates, as a rule, in temporarily acceptable or 
tolerable contracts relating to base pay, escalator ad 
justments, overtime, fringe benefits, hours and conditions of 
work, criteria for promotion and layoff, pensions and sup 
plementary unemployment benefits, retirement, rights and 
obligations of employees, and the prerogatives of manage 
ment. As the Secretary-Treasurer of AFL-CIO remarked at a 
conference of 1980 on productivity and the quality of 
worklife, collective bargaining is, indeed, "difficult and un 
tidy at times," but it has also "proven workable and fair 
on ... major issues"; and it could, furthermore, serve as 
"the logical mechanism for increasing the involvement of 
workers" in cooperative endeavors. 12
Negotiation also includes requested third-party interven 
tion for arbitration or mediation to settle contract disputes. 
Collective bargaining agreements often make provision for 
such intervention in addition to provision for the establish-
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ment and administration of in-house machinery to deal with 
worker complaints, grievances, and discipline problems. All 
such arrangements are interpretable as forms of coopera 
tion, but they are also "normal" enough to be regarded as 
outside the scope of this book. Certain other contractual 
provisions for cooperation along specific lines do, however, 
qualify for attention here; they may either concern matters 
sufficiently different from the ordinary bargaining issues or 
represent the culmination of experimental ventures that 
began outside the bargaining process. Some such ventures 
start as initiatives of management; others originate with dual 
blessing of labor and management, sanctioned by letters or 
memoranda of understanding.
The degree of extra-normal cooperation sought by the two 
(or three) parties varies according to the problem and the cir 
cumstances. Cooperation may be limited to discussion or 
consultation on specific matters of mutual interest (e.g., pro 
ductivity, product quality, or industrial peace); or it could 
also involve the adoption of agreeable procedures and action 
in accord therewith (as in the cases of safety, health, and 
alcoholism). At first, a need may be perceived for opening 
and maintaining two-way channels of communication to 
assure the effective implementation of contracts or ar 
rangements already in force; but, having achieved functional 
rapport and looking to the future, labor and management 
may wish to make joint exploration of additional complex or 
technical issues (e.g., adjustment to technological change) in 
an atmosphere of calm without the pressure of tight 
deadlines. The aim of such an endeavor may be the formula 
tion of a timely acceptable program; or it may also envisage 
installation and administration (as in the cases of pensions 
and Scanlon plans).
The disposition to collaborate and the choice of ap 
propriate joint undertakings depend not only on the spec 
trum of visible mutual concerns but also on less evident con-
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siderations. These considerations may be "philosophical," 
strategic, economic, or political. Labor and management 
both have traditional reservations regarding a semblance of 
open courtship. They could also have sharply different 
evaluations of the costs and benefits of particular 
cooperative programs. They may, furthermore, be subject to 
unequal influence by such external factors as the business cy 
cle, legislated standards and regulations, and earlier judicial 
rulings.
Among the vehicles of extra-normal collaboration are 
boards, commissions, councils, committees, and less formal 
study groups, work teams, and task forces. As has already 
been implied, ad hoc entities may first be set up experimen 
tally; if they prove constructive and viable, they may acquire 
permanence and recognition as "normal." Where the nature 
of the cooperation does not require active rank-and-file par 
ticipation, no explicit and identifiable joint structure may 
need to be set up.
Cooperation in the Adversarial Context
Familiar connotations of the adjective "adversarial" tend 
to obscure the place of cooperation in human affairs in 
general and in American industrial relations in particular. 
Since the opening sentence of a preceding section says that 
"this book is concerned with varieties of cooperation that 
complement or supplement the normal arrangements of 
labor and management for adversarial interaction in pursuit 
of predominantly economic objectives," some discussion of 
cooperation in an adversarial context is appropriate.
We start with a universal truism that, once stated, appears 
self-evident: Any protracted relationship among people is 
bound to exhibit elements of conflict, competition, and 
cooperation.^ The mix of elements varies, of course, from 
case to case; and, for each case, the mix varies through time 
also. When we call behavior "adversarial," we really mean
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that conflict and competition are conspicuously present or 
even are dominant, rather than that cooperation is complete 
ly absent. Thus, whatever opinions labor and management 
may hold of each other, they agree more often than not to 
function as "factors of production" to cooperate suffi 
ciently for the generation of the output and income that both 
want. When they bargain or otherwise negotiate over income 
shares and other matters, they tacitly or explicitly agree to 
follow various rules prescribed by custom, law, or common 
sense for arrival at mutually (if only temporarily) tolerable 
results. Even during strikes and other open hostilities, ag 
gression and violence usually are controlled, directed, or 
sublimated to avoid irreversible harm to the "production 
function" to avoid either extreme damage to plant and 
equipment or the "annihilation" of either party.
Another truism requires statement here, even though it too 
may seem gratuitous once it has been expressed: The in 
evitability of some degree of cooperation in any human 
enterprise does not assure either a full constructive realiza 
tion of the potential benefits of cooperation or a fair sharing 
of them. In the absence of complete mutual trust (the usual 
situation), even a genuine offer of extra-normal cooperation 
by a stronger adversary may be perceived by the weaker par 
ty as coercive, patronizing, or debilitating; and a similar 
gambit by a weaker adversary could in turn be perceived by 
the stronger one as a bid for change in the power balance. 
Again, in the absence of trust, the two parties may resign 
themselves to a life of barren circumstantial tangency instead 
of seeking more positive mutual fulfillment. This familiar 
dismal equilibrium itself inspires many observers to preach 
the remedy of cooperation.
Historians, political leaders, and elder statesmen of the 
business world and the labor movement often think of "pro 
gress" as a succession of social states dominated by single 
behavioral elements. Thus, they often see the arrow of
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human evolution or "civilization" pointing away from a 
"primitive" stage of conflict toward a more "advanced" 
stage of competition, and thence toward a "mature," and 
possibly "ideal," order of cooperation. In the realm of in 
dustrial relations, some such motion has actually occurred. 
The exigencies of two World Wars and the "laboristic" 14 
legislation of the New Deal (especially the Norris-LaGuardia 
Act of 1932, the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, 
and the Wagner Act of 1935) helped to replace an era 
characterized by labor-management conflict by an era 
featuring competition. These developments helped to shrink 
and to bound the vast original domain of "management 
prerogatives" that had been as sacrosanct as the overlapping 
domain of property rights; to confer legitimacy and respec 
tability on unionization; to establish collective bargaining as 
a national norm; and to diminish the violent potential of 
labor-management disputes. 15
The "progress" toward competition, however, is hardly 
complete. The strike weapon, for example, does not yet hang 
on a wall to rust. It is used with discomfiting frequency by 
street cleaners, transport workers, teachers, police officers, 
firefighters, and other local public servants. It is still used oc 
casionally in major industries, such as coal mining, that 
follow the rule of "no contract, no work"; and "wildcat" 
walkouts may occur almost anywhere. Especially remarkable 
was the illegal strike of air traffic controllers, a group of 
federal employees, as recently as August 1981. "Progress" 
toward competition, furthermore, has not meant 
economywide establishment of unionization on a firm foun 
dation of collective bargaining. Witness, for example, the 
enactment of "right-to-work" laws in many states under the 
umbrella of Section 14b of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947; the 
declining proportion of the workforce enrolled in unions; 
and the frequency with which government has acted as 
"first" party, rather than third, to promulgate work-related 
standards and guidelines.
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The time appears right for a more determined exploration 
than ever of the benefits derivable from labor-management 
cooperation, even if the 1980 elections portend a contraction 
of the federal role as third party. Visions of entry into a new 
era of collaboration, however, should be discounted in view 
of the preceding paragraph; the potentials of our own era of 
competition have been only partly realized, and vestiges of 
the era of conflict have not been exorcised. While welcoming 
new opportunities for joint action to mutual advantage, 
labor and management have good reason to cling to the 
adversary system and to continue circling each other in wary 
competition. The authenticity of the agreements emerging 
from their future interaction depends on the preservation of 
their individualities, which have been shaped by function, 
history, and memory. Their identities should not now be 
casually shed; cooperation should not become a synonym of 
co-option, nor should it become a euphemism for ir 
revocable transfer of economic decisionmaking power from 
the two parties to government in an unequal triple "partner 
ship."
The remarks just made probably still represent the major 
ity sentiment in business and labor ranks. Even if elder 
statesmen fail to mention reservations, limits, and cautions 
in their calls for attenuation of the adversarial spirit, the 
silent qualifications need to be kept in mind. After all, this 
spirit has served us well over the years if the payoff is 
reckoned in terms of material well-being, leisure, the 
amenities and the "democracy" of the workplace, 16 and the 
vigor, diversity, and openness of our society. Under 
"capitalism" with a human face, American workers have 
been able to strive successfully for the "more" that Gompers 
envisaged; they did not have to organize into a permanent 
"class" party and resign themselves to grim collective strug 
gle for problematic personal economic improvement under 
the banner of Marxism, socialism, or syndicalism. 17 Further 
more, workers remain free to seek union representation
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where it does not exist (e.g., in various "sunbelt" areas and 
in new Japanese-owned plants); and they also are free to 
petition and vote for decertification of unions already 
established. Management, too, is active in its own behalf, 
legally discouraging unionization and filing complaints, as 
required, against secondary boycotts and unfair picketing. 18
Cooperation in Industrial Relations Literature
Students of industrial relations have, of course, recogniz 
ed the element of cooperation in both the statics and 
dynamics of the adversarial interaction of labor and manage 
ment. In one well-regarded book, this interaction is called an 
"armed truce." 19 Another prominent author has called it 
"antagonistic cooperation," borrowing a phrase from W. 
G. Sumner, the pioneer American sociologist; and he spoke 
of the goal of "mutual survival," rather than victory by an 
nihilation. 20 A leading economist and systems theorist has 
observed that labor and management are bound together in a 
workable, though untranquil, marriage of convenience and 
necessity:
Industrial conflict is ... a curiously ambivalent 
affair, closer to the domestic battle of the sexes 
than to the clash of armies. Consequently, it is not 
difficult to build on the positive-sum or cooperative 
aspects of the game and to develop institutions that 
express this aspect. This is perhaps why the union, 
which may have been originally devised to pros 
ecute conflict in many instances becomes an instru 
ment to resolve it in a way . . . that an army never 
does. 21
The "positive sum" mentioned in the preceding quotation 
is a desideratum commended by many thoughtful commen 
tators on industrial relations. In other terminological guises, 
it is esteemed in the classical writings of such fields as scien 
tific management, industrial psychology, personnel ad-
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ministration, organization theory, and group dynamics. 22 A 
designer of quality of worklife committees, writing in 1980, 
was surely thinking of the the difference between a positive- 
sum game and a zero-sum game when he observed that labor 
and management must be taught the existence of cooperative 
modes of interaction having "win-win options" as alter 
natives to more familiar modes having " win-lose 
outcomes." 23 A major textbook of the 1960s concluded with 
the proposal that the two parties should progress from mere 
"conjunctive bargaining" to "cooperative bargaining," 
which is "at least a stage higher in the industrial relations 
evolutionary hierarchy." In the first of these two varieties of 
bargaining, excessive emphasis is said to be placed on "com 
petition," with possibly adverse spillovers for the general 
public; the second seeks "fuller exploitation of the special 
contribution which each party can make to an improved per 
formance," and without collusion at the expense of others. 24 
Another book of the same decade contrasted "distributive" 
bargaining, which focuses on relative shares of the common 
output, with "integrative" bargaining, which features (as in 
the Scanlon plan, discussed in chapter 8) cooperative prob 
lem solving in the interest of enlarging the common output. 25
Experience gained on the production front during World 
War I increased awareness of the potentials of cooperation 
in the workplace. In 1918, the year in which he was elevated 
to the Supreme Court, Brandeis lent his legal prestige to the 
proposition that the participation and "consent" of 
employees in the formulation of work rules and policies were 
more conducive to "efficiency" than was the usual manage 
ment practice of dictation. 26 Elton Mayo was saying similar 
things at the same time. 27 Mary Parker Follett, an influential 
business philosopher and consultant of the 1920s a period 
in which advanced management adroitly fought the inroads 
of unionism by more imaginatively addressing the wants of 
labor noted that disputes could be settled by three means: 
domination, compromise, and "integration."She advocated
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cultivation of the third approach, which requires no fun 
damental concession by either party yet yields ponderable 
benefits to both. 28 A business professor seconded the mo 
tion, referring to this constructive win-win outcome as the 
"double plus." 29
Seasoned labor leaders have also looked forward to 
peaceable times in which workers, management, and the 
public could realize the fruits of cooperation. In 1925, 
William Green, head of AFL, proposed that "the an 
tagonistic and hostile attitude, so characteristic of the old 
order in industry, must be supplanted by a friendly relation 
ship and a sense of obligation and responsibility." Indeed, 
through good faith on both sides, he ventured, "the com 
mon problems of industry can be solved, efficiency in service 
promoted, and economies in production introduced." 30 He 
was surely mindful of the contrast between labor's positive 
acceptance during World War I and the anti-union reaction 
of the aftermath. In 1940, when World War II had already 
engulfed Europe, Philip Murray, the head of CIO, envisaged 
that true acceptance of collective bargaining would lead to 
greater cooperation, with the union instrumental "in achiev 
ing efficient plant operation." Clinton Golden, an associate 
of Murray's in organizing the steelworkers, expressed a 
similar sentiment more strongly in a book published in 1942: 
"union-management cooperation tends to make manage 
ment more efficient and unions more cost-conscious, thereby 
improving the competitive position of a business enterprise 
and increasing the earnings of both workers and owners." 31 
In 1973, I. W. Abel, president of the United Steelworkers, 
recalled Murray's view of 1940 that labor and management 
could cooperate to meet threats to their common interests; 
he was writing in favor of the Experimental Negotiating 
Agreement (of which more will be said later), a "revolu 
tionary new bargaining procedure" eliminating the possibili 
ty of a nationwide strike or lockout and providing for volun 
tary arbitration of unresolved issues. This new approach was
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motivated by recognition of the ravages of the 1959 strike 
and of the encouragement given to stockpiling and to im 
ports by uncertainties as to the outcome of subsequent 
rounds of contract talks. 32
In the 1979 address of the president-elect of the Industrial 
Relations Research Association (IRRA), the "adversary" 
and "voluntary" principles were hailed as the twin pillars of 
the "American Ideology." According to this assessment, the 
two principles have served well historically, the tension be 
tween them keeping the tension between labor and manage 
ment generally within bounds. As a rule, the two parties have 
proved "practical" and "pragmatic," disposed to seek and 
accept compromise and incremental change. They have tacit 
ly agreed to "institutionalization" of the "bargaining 
game," with increasing reliance on "professional" players 
for attainment of "some equitable combination" of wages 
and profits. Furthermore, they have probed opportunities 
for "more direct collaboration," for establishment of 
"more constructive, integrative, cooperative, problem- 
solving, and trusting relationships to use the terms that 
have been variously applied to the 'higher' stage of industrial 
relations development.''
But, according to the same IRRA observer, something has 
been happening along the way to "voluntarism" the prin 
ciple that requires private parties to try to adjust their oppos 
ing interests with "maximum freedom" from outside in 
terference. He sees this principle "subjected to attrition by 
increased doses of state intervention" as the complementary 
adversary principle proves unable, or too slow, to meet cer 
tain new and important challenges. Among the egregious 
failures are: the peaceful and fair resolution of wage and 
other issues in the public sector, the acknowledgment and 
just disposition of the claims of women and minorities in 
company agreements, a proper recognition of the social con 
cern to halt inflation, and the satisfaction of many non- 
monetary needs or wants of workers (such as improvement
16 Beyond Open Hostilities
of worklife quality and of measures for occupational health 
and safety). Consequently, the IRRA observer sees private 
decisionmaking, particularly at the level of the firm, being 
outflanked; the state, as third party, is "moving in to 
regulate the results as well as the procedure of bargaining." 
He is discreetly silent on the encouragement of state incur 
sion offered by the private parties themselves not only 
through their neglect of changing labor market and socio- 
demographic realities but also through their active courtship 
of political power.
The Governmental Presence
The preceding section and the description of the five 
theaters at the outset attest to the pervasiveness of govern 
ment's involvement in contemporary economic affairs. The 
scale and diversity of federal participation have increased 
enormously under a wide assortment of influences, especial 
ly in the past two generations or so influences, incidentally, 
that will largely persist even if the 1980 elections are validly 
interpretable as a "mandate" to halt the proliferation and to 
reduce the variety and cost of federal programs. Some of the 
inspired cutbacks will have to be compensated, however 
tardily and reluctantly, by state and local (as well as new 
private) expenditures. Besides, some of the reductions will be 
replaced, or more than replaced by enlarged federal outlays 
for other purposes (e.g., defense). Accordingly, the share of 
all government jurisdictions in the gross national product 
will not decline significantly or at all. The economy, in short, 
will remain clearly "mixed," rather than become evidently 
private; and the long term trend toward governmental 
"monitoring" or regulation of the private sector's interac 
tions is more likely to be redirected and to become more dif 
fuse than to be arrested for long or clearly reversed.
The proliferating federal economic role has been shaped 
by many social, physical, technological, and psychological 
factors, and, of course, it has affected many of these in turn.
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It represents a response, in part, to the altering size, com 
position, and geographic distribution of the population, 
labor force, and industry. It also reflects, in part, the 
transformation of popular values, attitudes, and life styles. 
Thus, with the rise of material welfare and leisure, "industry 
and frugality" have lost their old vitality as personal 
precepts; and other storied virtues, such as individualism and 
self-reliance, have likewise lost much of their pristine appeal. 
Furthermore, voluntary association for the advancement of 
group interests, so much admired by early foreign observers 
like de Tocqueville, has increasingly involved the unabashed 
quest of political favor and even of public financial 
assistance. But American society is still open, as the 1980 
elections remind, so it remains responsive even to nostalgia 
in its continuing evolution.
Does the 1980 shift in the political spectrum foretoken a 
diminished federal presence in industrial relations? Probably 
not, despite some decentralization of power to the states and 
greater reliance on private decisionmaking. Not only will the 
traditional concerns that prompted the past growth and 
diversification of the federal economic role persist, but many 
new issues and problems will also demand federal address. 
For such reasons, government may be expected to remain a 
visible and potent third party in industrial affairs. Further 
more, it may be tempted during the first presidential 
quadrennium of the 1980s to act like a dominant first par 
ty for example, prescribing new rules of behavior for the 
other two parties, reversing the relative influence of labor 
and management in public counsels, and relinquishing 
established responsibilities or relegating them to the states. 
Such alterations of the status quo could, for a while, en 
courage retreat from competition to conflict in industrial 
relations. On the other hand, they could also improve the 
willingness of labor and management to seek cooperative 
solutions to the common problems that they face at the com 
pany, community, and industry levels. The coexistence of
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cooperation and adversarial strivings, as we have said so 
often in preceding pages, is not at all paradoxical.
American and Foreign 
Cooperative Styles33
At this juncture, we extend our opening remarks on inter 
national and intercultural differences affecting cooperative 
styles. We start with a few observations, some of them 
restating points already made, about the United States. Then 
we proceed to comment briefly on other nations with which 
we trade and compete for markets.
Five points regarding the United States deserve mention:
1. The basic adversarial premise of American labor- 
management relations historically has proved consistent with 
a preference for negotiation over open hostilities and, 
moreover, with a disposition to seek collaboration beyond 
the pale of prior contract.
2. The large federal presence has exerted a subtle pressure 
for labor-management cooperation, and this pressure can 
only increase with the devolution of various federal respon 
sibilities to the states.
3. Cooperation is also favored by the relative informality 
of interpersonal communications in our country between 
workers and their leaders, between workers and their super 
visors, between ordinary citizens and government officials.
4. The same may be said about the comparative lack of 
class rigidity and class consciousness (and the corollary no 
tion that room still exists for upward economic and social 
mobility).
5. The usual focus of American contract negotiation is the 
company or plant, even when bargaining is conducted on an 
industry level. (Thus, attention is given to local, shopfloor 
issues and to the workers' immediate concerns with pay, 
leisure, status, and aspects of the quality of working life. 
Matters left unresolved by contract are more likely to be ad-
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dressed cooperatively than to be deferred to tripartite com 
missions or to national elections.)
Manners of speaking in Western Europe may have con 
tributed to a mistaken view that workers there enjoy a 
superior shop environment. In 1969, a Canadian professor 
of industrial relations perceptively remarked that 
" misleading labeling" tends to convey the impression that 
"North American workers have less control over their daily 
lives than do their European counterparts." Actually, "the 
situation is just the reverse":
Neither codetermination, nor works councils, nor 
anything else European industrial relations systems 
have thus far produced protects workers as much as 
a local union can in North America, given the more 
sophisticated nature of our collective agreements 
and our grievance and arbitration procedures. 34
This appraisal still appears valid after a dozen years of 
quickening interest on both sides of the Atlantic in measures 
to "humanize" work or otherwise to improve the quality of 
working life. Three later informed comments follow.
In a comparative survey of industrial relations made in the 
late 1970s, American students saw labor and management in 
the United States matter-of-factly testing schemes of 
cooperation that were euphorically and grandly being iden 
tified in West Europe with "industrial democracy" and with 
evolution from "economic man" to "social man." Indeed, 
some of the European advances would not have been regard 
ed in the United States as evidences of "democracy" at all, 
or have been welcomed by workers there any more en 
thusiastically than by managers. The American observers 
considered symptomatic the absence, at a major conference 
on worklife quality held in the United States in May 1977, of 
buzzwords familiar to the European scene: codetermination, 
works councils, self-management, worker influence, rights
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to consultation, financial participation, shopfloor 
democracy, and so forth. Instead, they heard "words com 
ing from deep inside the American libertarian tradition," 35 
words like cooperation, dignity, trust, experiment, shared, 
collective bargaining, involvement, and human. In the Euro 
pean cases that they studied, they discerned little emphasis 
on worker decisionmaking and voluntary union- 
management collaboration; they missed the "pragmatic uni 
quely American sense of evolutionary trial and error growth 
without legal prescriptions therefor.*' 36
A group of American labor and management represen 
tatives touring three West German factories in May 1981 
found, unsurprisingly, that "the work humanization move 
ment, now about 10 years old, is taking divergent ap 
proaches in different countries, depending largely on each 
nation's culture." In the United States, where "in 
dividualism" has long held sway, the emphasis is on rank 
and file involvement in shopfloor decisionmaking. In West 
Germany, where "humanization" is supported by govern 
ment as well as private funds, an elected works council con 
sults with management on productivity issues. At each of the 
visited plants,
council members seemed offended when asked if 
they had an organized method of eliciting work- 
improvement ideas from ordinary employees, such 
as quality-of-worklife committees and quality 
circles so popular now in the U.S. and Japan. "We 
know what the workers want," they would reply. 37
A principal official of the United Auto Workers (UAW), 
writing in 1974, underscored the American difference while 
conceding European priority in efforts to increase 
significantly the explicit participation of workers in manage 
ment. 38 First, he observed that American unions have a daily 
and persistent responsibility for improvement of worklife 
quality, as any modern contract should make clear. Second,
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he stated that American unions would rather join with 
management in the design of satisfying jobs than stand by 
passively. Third, he claimed that greater participation of 
workers in decisionmaking is perceived in the United States 
as one of the elements of worklife quality. Such participa 
tion, he further opined, would, in keeping with the 
nonideological temper of American industrial relations, 
develop incrementally and focus on "managing the job" 
rather than "managing the enterprise."
Before turning to Japan, we note a curious proposal made 
in the European Economic Community in 1981 that is at 
great variance with the spirit of diversity that rules, even in 
the quest of greater cooperation, in the United States. This 
proposal contemplated compulsion of member countries to 
adopt a standard form of consultative council or board to 
serve as the vehicle of worker participation. It looked toward 
"harmonization" through a choice among four forms 
already used in Europe, including the German-style works 
council. 39
The cultural heritage of Japan has decisively shaped her 
pattern of industrial cooperation. It has transmuted such 
"American" ideas as statistical quality control and matrix 
management as tellingly as it has absorbed and exploited the 
principles and processes of Western technology. It is a 
holistic tradition that sets high value on patience, education, 
industriousness, parsimony, loyalty, mutual obligation, peer 
approval, respect for age and authority (which tend to be 
highly correlated), conformity, and consensus. Workers 
prefer attachment to firms offering lifelong employment; do 
not mind membership in company unions; identify their own 
welfare with their employers'; reputedly put forth more ef 
fort than their counterparts in the United States or West Ger 
many; often try to learn each other's jobs; accept pay that 
largely reflects company performance and their own age and 
seniority; and willingly master elementary statistics for better
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communication with supervisors and resident engineers on 
production problems. Management seems to be accessible 
and paternalistic, and department heads apparently avoid 
suboptimization in pursuit of company profitability. Par 
ticularly impressive to foreign observers is the close integra 
tion of productivity and cost objectives with the maintenance 
and improvement of quality, which is a paramount concern 
of all employees, all departments, and even of vendors and 
suppliers.
A few quotations from very recent (1980-81) writings add 
some detail to these general remarks on the significance of 
cultural factors in defining labor-management cooperation 
in Japan:
1. An article in an American business magazine states that 
the mass of learned studies of the Japanese style leaves 
" totally ignored" one vital element: " Japanese managers 
trust not only their workers but also their peers and 
superiors." This "all-encompassing trust leads to a 
simplified organizational structure that has helped many 
Japanese companies become low-cost producers." 40
2. According to the founder and president of a Japanese 
company making tapes and electronic parts, "the Japanese 
way of thinking about the enterprise is based on Buddhism: 
dedicating oneself to pleasing other people in the 
company." 41
3. A survey of Japanese industry made by a leading British 
weekly finds that "unions are still a cross between collective 
bargainers and personnel departments; 16 percent of com 
pany directors in Japan have once been union officials." In 
some of the large companies, unions are apparently retained 
"only as a formality." 42
4. The manager of the Washington office of the Japan 
Productivity Center declared in an interview that the worker 
safety record of his country is far better than ours and that 
"absenteeism is almost unheard of." He noted that chief ex 
ecutive officers are "usually" 65-70 years old and that pro-
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motion on the basis of seniority is still the rule: "If we don't 
do that, it will disrupt that teamwork concept." A foreman 
has at least 10 years of prior company experience and is also 
skilled in a broadly defined craft. Because he is allowed to be 
a member of the company union, he is a particularly useful 
two-way channel of communication between labor and 
management. Furthermore, he is encouraged by manage 
ment to be close to his workers, ideally to serve as a "parent 
figure." 43
5. Statistical quality control has become a national creed 
and the subject of a coveted annual prize and subsidiary 
awards. The prize is named for W. Edwards Deming, the 
American who lectured on the nature and use of the 
statistical technique in prostrate Japan after World War II. 
The award ceremonies are broadcast live on television. 
"Each year the competition grows in intensity as more and 
more companies volunteer to undergo the close scrutiny re 
quired." Winners of the prize and associated awards gain in 
"profits and prestige." For other companies, "the ceremony 
is a time for self-reckoning." 44
6. An American expert on business in Asia notes that "in 
Japan quality control is a management technique. It is a 
method of mobilizing, organizing and motivating people, a 
way of treating them with respect." 45
7. The managing director of a prominent Japanese firm 
speaks of the quality control circle as a means of restoring 
the "joy of production," the pride of craftsmanship, lost in 
scientific management. Members of the circles have the 
"pleasure" of hearing evaluations of company products 
directly from customers and also have the "excitement" of 
making presentations to their fellows. 46
8. The director of productivity improvement of an 
American aircraft company that has adopted the quality cir 
cle points to 15 years of Japanese development of the con 
cept before its attainment of worldwide attention. Our own 
culture, he surmises, may "not yet" provide a "fertile soil" 
for the concept, being disposed to seek "quick results" and
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"panaceas." All quality circles in our country represent, in 
his view, "pilot projects," none having yet "achieved in- 
stitutionalization." 47
Collaboration for Economic Renewal
In the years ahead, American labor and management will 
have good reason to explore more seriously than ever the 
potential benefits of cooperation. Foreign competition will 
prove a more cogent goad than will the claims made for 
foreign models. But additional threatening circumstances 
will also compel labor and management to adjust bargaining 
aims, strategies, and postures with more evident regard to 
their common interests. Among these circumstances are: a 
stubborn, revivable inflation; sustained high interest rates 
and reduced federal expenditures, both of which are intend 
ed to check this inflation; a further revolution in energy 
costs; and a major retreat of the federal government from 
responsibilities assumed during the past half century. The 
combined effect of all these pressures is to menace the pro 
fitability and viability of many major manufacturing firms 
and industries, the credibility of unions and of common 
managerial practices, the stability of once flourishing com 
munities and regions, and the future availability of jobs.
Cooperation will presumably be facilitated by a 
widespread and sober realism concerning the conditions of, 
and impediments to, success. Experience cited in later 
chapters should have taught labor and management that, 
despite the enthusiasms of many popular and scholarly 
writings, the path to significant and mutually beneficial col 
laboration is neither smooth nor unique, the journey is not 
costless or quick, and the desired end results are not assured 
or necessarily durable. Experience also underscores the im 
portance of top-level involvement, sustained commitment by 
the two parties, professional guidance and special training of 
pertinent personnel, reorientation of attitudes of middle and 
lower-level management as well as of local union officials,
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and so forth. The great payoff within a firm, industry, or 
community can come only with an evolution from isolated 
and tentative "experiments" in cooperation to more com 
prehensive and institutionalized practice.
In addition to the voluminous evidence of contemporary 
experimentation, it is desirable to take note of earlier im 
pressive collaborative responses to perceived industrial 
challenges. Outstanding in our nation's history was the for 
mation (detailed in chapter 5) of some 5,000 plant commit 
tees to help meet the massive production demands of World 
War II. Similar responses on a much smaller scale have also 
been called forth in the aftermath of disastrous strikes in 
various industries e.g., railroads, steel, and men's 
clothing. 48
Indicative of the new inclination to collaborate is the crea 
tion of a prestigious Labor-Management Group in March 
1981 without government participation. The coordinator of 
the Group is John T. Dunlop, a former Secretary of Labor 
who has long been a leader in the field of industrial relations. 
According to the Group's statement of purpose (see 
documentary appendix), "the national interest requires a 
new spirit of mutual trust and cooperation, even though 
management and organized labor are, and will remain, 
adversaries on many issues." Among its tasks will be the ex 
ploration of "a wide range of issues with particular emphasis 
on revitalizing the nation's economic base, rebuilding the 
private and public infrastructures on which our productive 
capacity as a nation depends, and stimulating safe and effi 
cient means for meeting the nation's energy needs." 49
Another indication of the ripeness of the time for 
widespread commitment to collaboration beyond the usual 
limits of collective bargaining is contained in the 1980 ad 
dress of the president of IRRA, the same scholar whose 1979 
observations have already been summarized. "A questioning 
mood," he stated in 1980, "is abroad in our land as we grope
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for explanations of our economic comedown in the 
world if we have come down." Indeed, "in industrial rela 
tions we are questioning once again the adversarial principle 
and its institutions." It is evident that, in the public sector, 
especially at the local government level, the principle too 
often is applied with great inconvenience to the citizenry. In 
general, the institution of bargaining operates best in deter 
mining financial rewards and the distribution of economic 
power. But, "come new questions like inflation, quality of 
worklife, affirmative action, which involve problem-solving 
rather than distributive processes, and collective bargaining 
either rejects these sorts of issues or adapts only with great 
strain." Our time of adversity requires a rethinking of "an 
cient truths." The afflicted automobile and steel industries 
provide a "laboratory" for new "experiments" in the "art 
of collaboration and problem-solving" experiments con 
cerned with " 'co-determination,' employee ownership, 
quality of worklife, and quality control." 50
An article of February 1981 in a major business magazine 
bears on the change in traditional attitudes already occurring 
in the beleaguered automobile industry. The UAW leader at 
Chrysler (where workers had agreed in 1979 to give up some 
of their negotiated gains in wages in behalf of employment 
maintenance and future profit sharing) is quoted as saying 
that his union would show "how to build cars cheaper, or to 
save on scrap" if such assistance would help keep a high-cost 
plant open. At Ford and GM, the article noted, management 
still balked at the suggestion of profit sharing, but "opposi 
tion to some forms of decisionmaking with the UAW may 
not be as adamant as in the past." According to a "manage 
ment insider,"
We can't afford to be too adversarial any more. 
The Japanese are taking care of that for us. A dif 
ferential of $700 a car is pretty persuasive evidence 
for gaining the cooperation of the union. 51
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By the end of 1981, Japanese competition and sluggishness 
of the American automobile market obliged (1) several 
UAW locals to accede to cost-saving work-rule concessions 
and (2) the national union board to allow company-level 
discretion on the reopening of the contracts before expira 
tion. Commenting on the work-rule concessions, the presi 
dent of UAW noted that "adversity causes people to change 
their minds." Other remarks suggest that the new bargaining 
agenda will include profit sharing and worker representation 
on company boards of directors as well as work-rule and 
wage concessions. 52
The 1980 contract between steel producers and the United 
Steelworkers (USA) called for establishment of "labor- 
management participation teams" as a means for improving 
productivity and worklife quality. This venture will be 
discussed in chapter 6. Meanwhile, we note a report on train 
ing begun for teams set up at selected plants on a trial basis 
that states: "The biggest problem, as other industries have 
discovered in trying the participatory approach, is convinc 
ing first-line supervisors that they must change their manage 
ment style and listen to the suggestions of workers instead of 
merely barking orders." There are skeptics, of course, in 
both USA and the companies, but a major movement has 
started with awareness that, at best, "it will take years for 
this shopfloor cooperation to spread throughout the in 
dustry." 53
Are the automobile and steel industries unique in their 
readiness to reconsider the sociology of work? No. In many 
others, such as aircraft and machinery construction, com 
munication equipment, and food, the enlistment of blue- 
collar interest in production methods, quality, and perfor 
mance is on the union-management agenda. 54 "Evidence 
suggests," according to an article of March 1981, "that the 
untapped potential may be substantial." The finger is now 
"pointing to managerial failings as a major cause of the 
decline in competitiveness"; and one egregious alleged fail-
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ing is that a "poor job" has been done "of enlisting 
employees on the side of increasing productivity." The same 
article cites a poll conducted for the U.S. Chamber of Com 
merce that indicates a surprising percentage of American 
workers thinking about ways to enhance company perfor 
mance. It concludes that "good management" would en 
courage such thinking by treating employees as "col 
laborators." 55
The Secretary-Treasurer of AFL-CIO concurs that 
workers constitute a "virtually untapped natural resource of 
ingenuity and enthusiasm." In an article published in 1980, 
he proposed that management can tap this resource by allow 
ing significant scope for worker participation in decision- 
making. Within the adversarial framework of collective 
bargaining, he called for a "limited partnership" for 
labor-management cooperation through committees, 
etc. to quicken national productivity and raise worklife 
quality. 56
We close this chapter with the pertinent authoritative 
testimony of the retiring chief executive officers of two of 
the nation's largest corporations. In an interview reported in 
February 1981, the retiring head of Du Pont attributed the 
Japanese productivity achievement to the close relationship 
between workers and management and tartly observed that 
his own company's efforts to maintain such a relationship 
since 1802 had often been deplored as "paternalistic." 57 The 
other retiree, from leadership of General Electric, told the 
same interviewer in March 1981 that "managerial malaise" 
is a principal factor in the decline of quality of American 
manufactures. He counseled a shift in company emphasis 
from short-run profit to longer term targets. He also saw a 
need for more direct involvement of workers in quality and 
productivity improvement: a turnaround is achievable, in his 
view, "only with tremendous cooperation between labor and 
management." 58
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NOTES
1. Our position, or at least our language, differs from that of, say, Business Week, May 
11, 1981, p. 85, where the adversarial approach is declared outmoded and obsolete, a threat 
to "the competitiveness of many industries"; and where a "march away" is sensed "from 
the old, crude workplace ethos and the adversarial relationship it spawns." We prefer a dif 
ferent well-established view that the adversary principle is a fundamental feature of the 
American system of labor-management relations and that it is not incompatible with the 
quest by both parties of more cooperation to mutual advantage.
2. Shorter wide-ranging treatments of cooperation are available, of course, in many 
places. See, for example, T. A. Kochan, Collective Bargaining and Industrial Relations 
(Homewood, IL: Irwin, 1980), p. 417 ff., and two articles by Edgar Weinberg: "Labor- 
Management Cooperation: A Report on Recent Initiatives," Monthly Labor Review, April 
1976, pp. 13-22, and "Survival Tactics," Executive, Fall 1980, pp. 17-21.
3. H. M. Douty, Labor-Management Productivity Committees in American Industry 
(Washington: National Commission on Productivity and Work Quality, May 1975), pp. 
49-52 presents and evaluates some of the published statistics on company and plant com 
mittees.
4. Cooperation in retreat may well become an outstanding phenomenon of industrial rela 
tions in the 1980s as stringent monetary and fiscal policies aggravate the plight of financial 
ly troubled firms. See Kochan, Collective Bargaining, pp. 439-41, on wage concessions 
prompted by the near bankruptcies of New York City and Chrysler Corporation; and 
Monthly Labor Review, March 1981, p. 73, for followup adjustments required at Chrysler. 
The latter publication also tells (p. 74) of labor cost concessions worked out at Firestone by 
a Joint Labor-Management Survival Committee; and of an indefinite salary freeze for 
nonunion workers at International Harvester motivated by high interest rates and a con 
traction of demand for farm and construction equipment. Pan American World Airways, 
according to Business Week, June 15, 1981, p. 37, asked its workers on June 2 to accept an 
immediate wage freeze and to contribute 10 percent of any pay increase negotiated through 
the end of 1983. United Airlines has obtained important productivity concessions (especial 
ly the use of two pilots instead of three in the cockpits of Boeing 737s) in a new contract 
negotiated with pilots (Business Week, August 17, 1981, pp. 27-28). In return for a profit- 
sharing plan, Trans World Airlines has asked workers to accept an immediate pay freeze 
through the end of 1982 (Washington Post, July 28, 1981). In July 1981, Chrysler and the 
United Auto Workers agreed on a profit-sharing plan (beyond employee stock ownership) 
to help workers regain pay sacrificed in keeping the company alive ( Washington Post, July 
24, 1981). For additional examples and comment, see last section of this chapter; chapters 
3, 4, 7, and 8; and Peter Henle, "Reverse Collective Bargaining: A Look at Some Union 
Concession Situations," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, April 1973, pp. 956-968.
5. See, for example, C. R. Daugherty, Labor Problems in American Industry (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1936), chapter 27; J. T. McKelvey, AFL Attitudes toward Production: 
1900-1932 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952), pp. 56-60; and Reinhard Bendix, Work 
and Authority in Industry (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), chapter 5.
6. This variety of cooperation is discussed by Slichter, Healy, and Livernash, Impact of 
Collective Bargaining, pp. 846-51.
7. Contemporary examples are numerous. In the needle trades, management as well as 
labor has promoted consciousness of the union label. According to the head of the Interna-
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tional Ladies Garment Workers Union, furthermore, "some of the most notorious anti- 
union manufacturers regularly go to Capitol Hill with us" to petition for protection against 
the flood of imports (Philip Shabecoff, "Labor and Management Amity," New York 
Times, January 11, 1981). Similar joint petitions have emanated from the textile, 
automobile, and steel industries. In Business Week, April 13, 1981, pp. 45-46, it is reported 
that a "coalition of unions and corporations is pressing to rewrite the rules under which 
$7.3 billion worth of usually dutiable imports entered the U.S. free of tariffs last 
year" rules established in accord with 1974 legislation intended to assist 140 less 
developed countries but now, ironically, deemed inimical to the interests of even "the $18 
billion high-technology electronic components industry."
For some earlier instances of joint or parallel action, see S. H. Slichter, J. J. Healy, and 
E. R. Livernash, The Impact of Collective Bargaining on Management (Washington: 
Brookings Institution, 1960) p. 841; and N. W. Chamberlain and J. W. Kuhn, Collective 
Bargaining 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), p. 430.
In 1980, a federal district court found price-fixing and per se violation of antitrust law in 
the 1976 agreement between the National Electrical Contractors Association (NECA) and 
the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers. The decision left the two organiza 
tions vulnerable to claims for injunctive relief and triple damages (totaling about $100 
million) by as many as 7,800 nonmembers of NECA.
8. Our comment on the adversarial approach in footnote 1 should be recalled here.
9. According to Philip Taft and Philip Ross, "American Labor Violence: Its Causes, 
Character, and Outcome," in Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspec 
tives, Report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, 
Washington, June 1969, Vol. I, pp. 221-301, "the United States has had the bloodiest and 
most violent labor history of any industrial nation in the world." They note some calming 
of labor-management relations, however, with the provision of a legislative basis for a na 
tional labor policy in the 1930s and subsequent years.
10. D. L. Cole, The Quest for Industrial Peace (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), pp. 95,
155.
11. S. H. Slichter, Union Policies and Industrial Management (Washington: Brookings In 
stitution, 1941), p. 1.
12. T. R. Donahue, "The Human Factor in Productivity," AFL-CIO American Federa- 
tionist, December 1980, p. 13.
13. An illuminating discussion is provided by Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Con 
flict (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964). Some readers may also find of interest a re 
cent article by Robert Axelrod and W. D. Hamilton, "The Evolution of Cooperation," 
Science, March 27, 1981, pp. 1390-1396. It seeks to account for the development of 
"cooperation, such as altruism and restraint in competition" and thus to overcome a "dif 
ficulty" of Darwinism, which stresses "the struggle for life and the survival of the fittest."
14. This adjective is often attributed to S. H. Slichter.
15. See footnote 9.
16. "Industrial democracy" is a hardy term of the labor lexicon, endowed with different 
meanings in different contexts and countries and nowadays commonly identified in the 
United States with greater work autonomy, participation in management, and other aspects 
of worklife quality. See two articles by Milton Derber in Labor History: "The Idea of In-
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Research, 1979); and Irving Bluestone, "Emerging Trends in Collective Bargaining," in 
Work in America: The Decade Ahead (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1979), pp. 
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17. The pragmatic and opportunistic cast of mainstream American unionism was 
developed only after efforts to organize along "European" lines. Gompers, it should be 
recalled, started as an "immigrant radical," not with the notion of "business unionism" 
that has proved so successful in the American setting. See Daugherty, Labor Problems, p. 
442.
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